Abstract. This study examines 2,933 cases of Japanese investment in 27 provinces and regions in China to identify the role that policy determinants had in influencing the sub-national location decision of Japanese firms in China. The empirical results show that the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Opening Coastal Cities (OCCs) were a successful policy instrument initially, as SEZs and OCCs had a strong influence on Japanese foreign investment during the early years of China's liberalized foreign investment environment. Since the mid-1990s SEZs and OCCs have attracted proportionally less foreign investment as competition from other special investment zones has intensified in China. From these observations, we discuss the periodic influence of SEZs and OCCs and introduce and review the influence of newly emerging investment zones. We also draw inferences to the location choice literature in terms of understanding the variable influence of policy factors and traditional locational indicators as driven by temporal changes in investor motivations and preferences in a country.
INTRODUCTION
From the late 1970s -when China initiated its economic reforms and open-door policy -to the onset of the year 2000, China has drawn increasingly larger shares of worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In 1996, for example, China alone accounted for over 40 per cent of FDI flows to all developing countries (UNCTAD 1997) . Indeed, since 1994, China has become the second largest recipient nation of FDI in the world after the United States.
With this growth, issues related to the location choice of FDI in China have drawn increasing interest from both academics and industry analysts (Goddard 1997; Zhao and Zhu 2000) .
Research to date has taken the stance that China's market size and its potential has attracted foreign investors, with much of the analysis preceding from a descriptive or anecdotal base (Beamish and Wang 1989; Luo and O'Connor 1998; Henley, Kirkpatrick, and Wilde 1999) .
By comparison, empirical work drawing from extant research on influences on the location choice decision in China has been sparse (Cheng and Kwan 2000; Zhao and Zhu 2000) . In the interest of extending empirical research on cross-national and sub-national location choice to the case of China, we examine how unique features of China's investment environment, namely government-sponsored incentives, have influenced the location choice of Japanese firms. Using a sample of 2,933 subsidiaries of Japanese firms situated in 27 provinces and regions in China, we attempt to identify if Japanese investors responded to policy initiatives, specifically the development of trade development zones and special economic zones, or if other factors drove the location decision. From this examination, we also infer if economic zones contributed to the growth of foreign investment in China.
The choice of Japan as the source country is motivated by several considerations.
First, Japan emerged as a leading source of FDI outflows in the 1980s and 1990s concurrent with China's growth as a recipient of FDI. Second, despite the overall contraction in Japanese FDI during the 1993-1995 period (UNCTAD 1997) , Japanese investment in China soared.
Third, Japanese investment in China is not a new phenomenon. In the first few decades of the 1900s, Japanese firms made a considerable number of investments in China (Yoshino 1976) .
As Japanese firms resumed investment activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s, a salient question is whether these firms were responding to a more generally open investment regime, or to specific FDI policy incentives.
BACKGROUND ON FDI IN CHINA
Foreign investment in China has a long history. In the early 1900s, British, French, German and Russian firms were the most active foreign investors in China. Collectively, firms from these countries accounted for nearly 90 percent of all foreign investment in China in 1902 (Wu 1958) . The importance of these nations as foreign investors in China declined in the next forty years as the nominal value of Japanese investment in China grew from a low position of US$53 million (3.5 percent of the total value of FDI in China in 1902) to US$6,829 million in 1944. The latter figure represented 75 percent of all foreign investment in China in 1944. It marked the peak value of investment in China during Japan's occupation of China (Wu 1958) . Notable about foreign investment during this period is the relative absence of joint ventures, and its concentration in Shanghai and the northern provinces of China (Hayter and Han 1997) .
Between 1949 and 1976, China followed its economic strategy of self-reliance. After the institution of the Act of Joint Venture Enterprises in 1979, which formally re-opened China's doors to FDI, foreign investment began to resume. The Act mandated that foreign firms take a minimum equity share of 25 percent in foreign invested enterprises, but it did not prescribe a maximum. As well, in the original Act, foreign investment was limited to four Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Zhuhai. The fifth SEZ, Hainan, was added in 1988 (see Table 1 ).
In these SEZs, a variety of FDI incentives were promoted. For example, a two-year tax holiday was granted to foreign subsidiaries on the first two-years of profitable operations; the third to fifth years of profitability were taxed at 50% of normal rates. Duties were eased on the import of equipment and the export of product; and other barriers, such as entry and exit formalities, were reduced (Jia 1994) . Among other factors, vast tracts of land were allocated for commercial uses and greenfield establishments, which especially attracted much of the Hong Kong investment in the early periods. Even with the establishment of SEZs; however, several barriers to investment still existed. Lockett (1987) , for example, identified poor infrastructure, bureaucracy, low labor productivity and a weak legal framework as the main problems faced by managers of foreign subsidiaries in SEZs.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The geographic scope of FDI promotion was broadened in 1984 and 1985. The size of the original SEZs was expanded to become open economic zones and another fourteen coastal cities, known as Open Coastal Cities (OCCs), were opened to FDI. In fact, many OCCs had a higher level of economic and infrastructure development than the SEZs in the early 1980s.
Foreign investors in OCCs received tax concessions similar to, but not as munificent, as those in SEZs. For instance, foreign invested enterprises located in the OCCs generally paid national profit taxes at rates of 24 to 30 percent, while those in the SEZs often enjoyed rates as low as 15 percent. Similar differences existed in other areas such as exemptions and reductions of profit taxes, import duties, and land use fees (Cheng and Kwan 2000) .
SEZs and OCCs were confined to a small set of cities along the coast. To attract FDI to more regions, the Chinese government introduced new and high-technology industrial development zones (NTZ). These zones had two levels. There was the national level which included 52 newly-established regions created in the 1991 to 1992 period. There was also local level development in which provincial governments imitated national level creations of these new development zones. The new and high technology industrial development zones mirrored the policies of economic and technology zones created in other countries.
Another type of zone, created shortly after the opening coastal cities were instituted, has been labelled Economic and/or Technology Development Zones (ETDZs). The creation of ETDZs helped to partially compensate for the unbalanced development of China. If we consider the SEZs to be five points in the south, and OCCs are the fourteen cities connected through the north to the south as a line along China's east coast, ETDZs are small areas within cities in different provinces that are distributed widely in China. ETDZs, in a sense, are not directly comparable to SEZs or OCCs as only a small area within a city enjoys a preferential policy in the case of an ETDZ, compared to the city-wide coverage of an SEZ or OCC designation. ETDZs differ from SEZs as the administrators within an ETDZ have more freedom to issue preferential policies. The focus of ETDZs is also somewhat different from SEZs. ETDZs focus on enhancing the competitiveness of specific industries by emphasizing the development of productive capabilities and technology research, while prioritizing infrastructure development and the provision of energy and communications (Jia 1994) . SEZs, meanwhile, aimed to develop export-oriented businesses.
A fifth type of zone focussed on encouraging and fostering international commerce while stimulating the local economy. Its principal instruments were the abolition or reduction of import duties, the removal or reduction of import quotas and a change in tax structure to foster the development of local and foreign businesses. Appropriately, these zones were The value of FDI in China increased from US$1.8 billion in the 1979 to 1982 period to $3 billion in 1988, then to more than $11 billion in 1992, and to $35.8 billion in 1995 (China Statistical Yearbook, various issues). In 1995, FDI accounted for 5.5 percent of China's GDP.
SEZs and OCCs were most prominent in FDI during the 1980s (Beamish and Wang 1989; Hayter and Han 1997) . Beamish and Wang (1989) reported that, up to 1985, 65.6 percent of foreign investment projects took place in SEZ and OCCs. According to Hayter and Han (1997) , nearly 90 percent of FDI (in value) made to 1985 was situated in the original four SEZs (Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Zhuhai). However, entering the 1990s, the share of FDI in these areas, particularly in SEZs, declined (Goddard 1997; Hayter and Han 1997 were a number of newly implemented ETDZs, OCAs, and other cities in the coastal regions, that could take a share of FDI inflows. Second, FDI also started to expand to some inland provinces owing to the reconsideration of strategies in China by foreign investors. Research has observed structural changes in the location of FDI (Hayter and Han 1997) . Luo and O'Connor (1998) reported that in the inland provinces the number of foreign enterprises increased by ten fold and investment values increased by more than 20 times from 1990 to 1995.
Alongside this change, an evolution of FDI in China has also been exhibited in the entry mode selected (Lu 2000) . In the 1980s, more than 80 percent of foreign investment took the form of equity or contractual joint ventures. At the end of the 1980s, just 8 percent of FDI had been made through the establishment of wholly owned enterprises. Since 1990, however, the latter form of FDI has grown substantially. In 1996, almost 37 percent of the total value of projects signed was in the form of wholly owned enterprises (Luo and O'Connor 1998) . This reflects a growing confidence investors feel about establishing a presence in China (Henley et al. 1999 ). This, however, at the same time inspires a question about whether governmentsponsored incentives, in particular, continue to exert a significant influence on FDI flows.
LOCATION CHOICE AND FDI
Empirically, a large volume of research has examined locational determinants of FDI. The vast majority of the previous statistical investigations focused on developed countriesmostly the US -as the host country environment (e.g. Bartik 1985; Coughlin, Joseph, and Arromdee 1991; Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman 1992; Woodward 1992; Hill and Munday 1992) . A recurrent theme is the emphasis of the following four sets of factors as the locational determinants of FDI: market-related factors, labor cost, transportation infrastructure, and government policy (see Dunning 1993 for an extensive review).
The rationale for considering market-related factors is straightforward: a large market grants benefits such as scale economies and high revenue generation. The literature has provided supporting evidence that market size and market growth are important factors in the location decisions of FDI (Scaperlanda 1967; Schmitz 1970; Goldberg 1972; Lunn 1980; Hill and Munday 1992; Yamawaki, Thiran, and Barbarito 1996) .
Cost is also a major concern for the site selection of FDI, which reflects mostly on the theory of international division of labour (Zhao and Zhu 2000) . In light of this, high wage rates and high unionisation rates were often found to act as deterrents to FDI flows (Friedman et al. 1992 ), but contrasting results exist (Zhao and Zhu 2000) .
Transportation infrastructure relates to the nature of production, which requires the availability of adequate roads, railways, ports, and other facilities for the purpose of operational efficiency. Studies have confirmed that FDI was attracted to regions that had better transportation infrastructure (Coughlin et al. 1991; Loree and Guisinger 1995) .
Finally, government policy has generally been viewed as a key variable that can alter the flows of FDI across regions. In this regard, early research has tended to emphasize the influence of trade tariffs on the location choice of FDI (Scaperlanda 1967; Schmitz 1970; Goldberg 1972) . Lunn (1980) , for example, found high trade barriers led to high levels of US FDI in European countries. Other studies focussed on other types of government policy such as corporate tax rates, lengths of tax holidays and other financial incentives (Bartik 1985; Luger and Shetty 1985; Grubert and Mutti 1991; Loree and Guisinger 1995) . With few exceptions (Scaperlanda 1967; Contractor 1991) , extant research provides general support for the idea that policy promotions have a positive impact on FDI flows.
Recent research has moved from a focus on cross-national location choice to a focus on a sub-national level examination of locational determinants (Coughlin et al. 1991; Friedman et al. 1992; Hill and Munday 1992; Woodward 1992; Kotabe 1993; Head et al. 1995; Shaver and Flyer 2000) . Arguably, a sub-national level allows for a more fine-grained analysis of regional differences, and therefore may offer more accurate evidence for the sensitivity of FDI decisions to locational determinants. Similar to national level studies, studies of sub-national determinants of the location of FDI have confirmed the positive and significant effect of market-related factors while providing inconclusive findings about other factors. Hill and Munday (1992) , for example, identified market access factors and financial incentives as important determinants of the distribution of FDI in the United Kingdom. A series of other studies, however, reported mixed results about the effects of policy determinants such as taxes and promotional activities on the location of FDI in the US (Coughlin et al. 1991; Friedman et al. 1992; Woodward 1992; Kotabe 1993 ).
The mixed findings of the policy effect may rest in several areas. First, a local government often implements a variety of investment promotions, such as tax concessions, subsidies, waiving environmental or employment safety standards, and relaxing some sort of performance requirements. Such data, however, are often not only lacking consistency and availability, but are also difficult to operationalize (Kotabe 1993; Loree and Guisinger 1995) .
This results in discrepancy in using policy measures and difficulties in generating consistent empirical findings across studies. Second, investment attraction programs are usually an ongoing effort involving various promotional activities. As such, any static analysis, which is often based on different samples of cross-sectional data, might not capture the dynamic causeeffect relationship between promotional activities and resultant FDI in a host region (Kotabe 1993 ). Third, measures of FDI vary from study to study. Loree and Guisinger (1995) Interestingly, Japanese FDI seems to be particularly sensitive to agglomeration (Kotabe 1993; Smith and Florida 1994; Head et al. 1995) .
Research on firm heterogeneity has shown that firms place differential valuations on a region's locational characteristics. Shaver and Flyer (2000) argued that although agglomeration exists, it tends to be most prevalent among firms with weaker advantages. In a similar research context, Chung and Alcacer (2001) observed that firms differentially valued locational advantages of a state, with firms that had relatively low R&D intensities more likely to chose states where more technical capabilities resided.
EXISTING STUDIES ON THE LOCATION OF FDI IN CHINA
Since the early 1980s, a number of studies investigated location choice issues in China.
Much of this research is descriptive or anecdotal (Lockett 1987; Beamish and Wang 1989; Goddard 1997; Hayter and Han 1997; Luo 1997) , with few based on statistical methodologies (Cheng and Kwan 2000; Zhao and Zhu 2000) . Zhao and Zhu (2000) , who looked at investment choices at the city level, investigated whether firms with different countries of origin responded differently to locational factors. Particularly relevant to the present study is the finding that Japanese investments tended to favour those areas with low rental costs, abundant human capital, and high export intensity. Zhao and Zhu (2000) , however, did not investigate the effect of government policy on FDI. Meanwhile, Cheng and Kwan (2000) emphasized government policy and agglomeration economies. Using provincial level tests, Cheng and Kwan (2000) found SEZs, OCCs, and other key policy designations had a positive effect on FDI, but SEZs had the greatest impact.
METHODS

DATA SOURCES
Our source for the Chinese subsidiaries of Japanese firms was Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran-Kuni Betsu (Japanese Overseas Investments -by country), a publication of Toyo Keizai (1999) . Toyo Keizai collected these data as part of an annual survey of the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms. The 1998 edition of Japanese Overseas Investments listed 2,933 subsidiaries in China, in which location was specified. Information on the industry of the subsidiary was also included. We grouped subsidiaries into one of three broad categories:
extractive or primary industries (77 cases), manufacturing or secondary industries (2,192), and services or tertiary industries (664).
We obtained data on the regional characteristics in China from three sources: Doing Business With China (Reuvid 1994) , a large compendium of information put together for the purpose of informing the potential investor on regional variance within China, and China Market Atlas -1997 edition (Goddard 1997) , a research report of The Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU). Our third source was the China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics People's Republic of China, various editions). All items, with the exception of labor productivity, number of students per 1000 population and number of science and technology workers, were annual time-varying measures from 1986 forward ( Table 2) .
DATA DESIGN
Based on the subsidiary records, we identified the city, province and year in which a subsidiary was established. All provinces but three, Qinghai, Xizang and Gansu, received a Japanese foreign investment in the 1980-1998 period. In the other provinces, 190 cities in China received at least one FDI. These 190 cities formed the choice set for subsequent analyses. We designed our data as an annual time series of FDI flows into these 190 cities.
As we describe below, flows were measured by employment in new establishments, and counts of new establishments. With 190 cities, and 19 time periods, we had 3,610
observations.
VARIABLES
The primary dependent variable, JFDI it , is the extent of Japanese FDI activity in city i in year t, and is measured by the total number of employees in Japanese subsidiaries located in the focal city. The measure is used to capture the FDI flows (Yamawaki et al. 1996) . For a given year, if there was no new Japanese FDI inflows into a given city, a zero would be recorded.
From the total of 3610 city-year combinations over the 1980-1998 time period, there are 2955 cases with a zero record of JFDI it . Given this data structure, an ordinary least square (OLS) approach is inappropriate and we employed a maximum likelihood estimation based on TOBIT modelling. A TOBIT model is particularly suitable for analysing data which is truncated at a higher or lower value. To capture the effect of FDI agglomeration, we constructed a variable called Agglomeration, which is measured by the cumulative count of Japanese subsidiaries in a given city i in a given year t-1 . Subsidiaries that had exited were not included in the measure. Next, we included provincial level factors capturing various aspects of endowments relevant to the location choice of FDI in the city. Based on our review of empirical literature we selected 22 variables related to the aforementioned locational determinants. It should be noted that data availability limited us to the use of provincial level data, even though empirical tests were conducted at a city choice level. While we acknowledge this limitation, we note that provincial level data can provide a pertinent scope for capturing the effect of regional market, infrastructure, and other factors on the location choice of FDI. Secondly, per capita GDP, and other economic conditions and natural endowments that are related to attracting foreign investment also differed markedly from province to province. We expect these large variations to exert an influence on the location choice of foreign investors, especially in a geographically large and regionally disparate country like China.
Because many of the variables were conceptually similar, a process of data reduction was conducted. To generate a set of factors that have empirical coherence, principle components analysis using Quartimax rotation was performed on the selected variables.
After three iterations, in which we removed items that loaded highly on more than one factor, we ended with the four factor solution depicted in Table 2 . In this solution, factor retention was based on an examination of scree plots and eigenvalues. As shown, the four factors accounted for 80 percent of the variance in the 18 items. We named the four factors Regional Development, Market Size, Trade and Transportation Infrastructure.
Regional Development is a factor that indicates the level of development of education, via training and expenditures in a province, as well as the development of local enterprise.
GDP, household expenditures, disposable income and population are conventional indicators for market size and potential, hence the label Market Size. Trade comprised exports and imports and captured the extent of trading ties between China and the rest of the world.
Transportation Infrastructure designates the density of a province's road and railway network.
[Insert Table 2 here]
We included two measures for temporal influences on investment location dynamics.
First, we adopted a measure of the annual FDI flow (in billion US$) in China to capture the overall trends in foreign investment. The variable is denoted FDI_China. Second, we constructed an age variable to measure, in a given year t, the number of years since China opened its door to foreign investors. The variable, denoted as Age_Open, ranges from 1 to 19, corresponding to the 1980-1998 time span covered by this research. The Age_Open variable allows us to develop a set of interaction terms with the five policy variables, which capture the varying effect of government policies on the flows of Japanese FDI over time.
As might be expected, the interaction terms had high correlations with the respective constituent items. Other correlations were generally low, with the greatest being between market size and the investment time variable (r=0.76; Table 3 ). Correlations between provincial characteristics and the policy variables were likewise low providing reassurance 14 that the policy variables were not substituting for measurement of other regional factors.
[Insert Table 3 here] to Japanese FDI. Fujian, for example, has one SEZ and one OCC, but it ranked tenth among recipient provinces. Beihai in Guangxi was promoted as an OCC, and the whole province of
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Hainan was promoted as an SEZ. Even so, Hainan and Guangxi were not successful in attracting Japanese FDI. The level of Japanese FDI in the two provinces was even lower than that in less-developed inland provinces such as Neimengu and Anhui.
[Insert Table 4 here] Table 4 also shows that Japanese FDI is highly concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Overall, manufacturing FDI accounted for three-quarters of the total subsidiaries formed and over 85 percent of the total employment. Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and
Liaoning are the largest recipients of manufacturing FDI. Comparatively, judging on the total employment and subsidiary counts, it seems that Japanese FDI in Guangdong was of a larger scale, or at least more labor intensive than that in other areas. Turning to the service sector, it is clear that Japanese FDI tended to concentrate in only a few geographic areas. Shanghai and Beijing emerged as the heart of Japanese service sector FDI, together accounting for half of the total Japanese investment in this sector. Of the remaining share, a vast majority was accounted for by Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tianjin, and Liaoning. Table 5 provides an indication of the city-level distribution of Japanese FDI in China.
It presents a list of major cities ranked by the total number of employees and the total number of subsidiaries, respectively. These cities possessed more than 75 percent of the total Japanese FDI in China. Figure 1 shows that Japanese FDI began to increase in China around the mid-1980s, the time at which the 14 OCCs were initiated. Japanese FDI had since continued to grow. A rapid increase was then seen in the early 1990s, in particular, after 1992. This evidence is consistent with both research reports and anecdotes in prior literature (Luo and O'Corner 1998; Henley et al. 1999; Zhao and Zhu 2000) . As shown, Japanese FDI in OCCs shot-up during this time period. As noted earlier, a number of cities implemented incentive policies toward FDI in the early 1990s. Interestingly, Japanese FDI also grew considerably in cities without preferential policies, indicating an increasingly greater geographic coverage in China.
In contrast to the growing attractiveness of other cities in China, the growth of Japanese FDI in SEZs was slow. The flow of FDI in SEZs began to decline since 1991. Overall, SEZs only had about seven percent of the total Japanese subsidiaries in China, or about ten percent of the total employment in all Japanese subsidiaries. OCCs, in contrast, accounted for the lion's share of Japanese FDI in China: 48.2 percent of the total establishments and 44.7 per cent of total employment. The share of Japanese FDI in cities with other types of policy incentives was about 25 percent, and in cities without promotions was about 20 percent. Table 6 reports seven models, which were developed in a hierarchical manner using the TOBIT procedure. Model fit statistics show that the addition of new variables across the models significantly improved model fit, compared to the preceding baseline model. In Model 1, land area was the sole variable. This specification assumes that the FDI location decision was a random one. Larger provinces, solely by virtue of their greater land area, will receive larger amounts of FDI (Bartik 1985) . In model 2, FDI_China was added to capture the general trend of the growth of FDI in China. Model 3 adds the four factors generated from the principle components analysis. The agglomeration variable was included in Model 4 to capture the pulling effect of prior Japanese subsidiary establishment. Models 5 through 7
RESULTS
incorporate policy variables --model 5 adds the aggregate policy variable, Economic Region Dummy; model 6 replaces this dummy variable with five specific policy variables, SEZ, OCC, ETR, NTR, and TAX; and model 7 adds the age variable Age_Open and a set of interaction terms between Age_Open and the five policy variables. In model 7, FDI_China was excluded because it has a high correlation with Age_Open.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Starting from the theoretic variables of interest, all policy variables, except the TAX variable give rise to positive and highly significant coefficient estimates in models 6 and 7.
The positive estimate on Age_Open (p<0.001) captures an over-time effect of China's liberalization, in which investment levels grew strongly, at least to 1996. The results suggest that, although the increase in the level of Japanese FDI can be explained by an increasingly improved investment environment, preferential FDI policies designated to promote certain regions still have an effect over-and-above a general increase in FDI flows.
Although there was a positive effect among four of the five policy variables, this effect tended to decline over time in SEZs and OCCs, to a lesser extent. This is given in the negative coefficient estimates for the interactions between the time of investment and the policy promotions SEZ and OCC.
Turning to the other variables, the coefficient estimates for Agglomeration are positive and significant across the models, and consistent with prior research (Kotabe 1993; Florida and Smith 1994; Head et al. 1995) . The results suggest that prior Japanese FDI has a pulling effect for ensuing investment. Before entering the policy and agglomeration variables, the four endowment factors each had a positive and significant effect. The coefficient estimates on these endowment variables dropped considerably when Agglomeration and the policy variables were added, with Trade and Market Size tending to insignificance.
Finally, Land Area and FDI_China give rise to positive and significant coefficient estimates. FDI_China indicates that Japanese FDI in China largely followed the trend of overall foreign direct investment in China. As for the land variable there is a change in sign.
When no other sub-national variables were considered, the estimates on Land Area were negative and significant. This reflects the fact that inland provinces, which are often much larger than coastal provinces, were less favourable to Japanese FDI. In full specifications, the estimates turn out to be positive and significant implying that, all else being equal, a larger province had a better position than a smaller one in attracting Japanese FDI.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To examine the robustness of these results, we re-ran the TOBIT regression models on subsamples; that is, by limiting the observation of JFDI it to manufacturing and service sectors sub-samples. We also employed an alternative measure of JFDI it -subsidiary count. Table 7 presents the results of both the TOBIT models and Negative Binomial models. We tested, but did not report models, with measures of JFDI it based on capital and sales levels in subsidiaries. Although similar to the results in Table 6 , we had less confidence in interpreting the results because 30-40 percent of subsidiaries did not report capitalization or sales values.
[Insert Table 7 here] Models 8 through 11 produced a similar estimation pattern to that shown in Table 6 .
In particular, SEZ, OCC, Agglomeration, Transportation Infrastructure and Age_Open were all estimated to be positive and significant, consistent across samples and measures. Notably, however, there are differences in estimation results between the two sectors. First, Regional
Development and Land Area in Models 10 and 11, FDI_China in Model 10, and three policy variables in Model 11 are insignificant. The result reflects the fact that Japanese FDI in the service sector was highly concentrated in only a few areas and also shows that Japanese subsidiaries in different sectors responded differentially to policy incentives. Particularly interesting is perhaps the estimates on Trade. Although the significance level is only at 0.075, the result suggests that Japanese FDI in the service sector was driven by trading ties unlike manufacturing investment which was not sensitive to prior trade ties.
Meanwhile, the Negative Binomial coefficient estimates in models 12 and 13 showed a strong convergence with those in TOBIT models 6 and 7. This convergence illustrates that the results were not sensitive to our definition of the dependent variable as a count of new subsidiary establishments or as employment in those subsidiaries.
DISCUSSION
This paper examined the locational determinants of Japanese FDI in China and give evidence supporting some of the general trends observed in the international location literature.
Further this study outlines several key influences on Japanese firm's sub-national location choices within China. These influences emerged from typical regional factor endowment advantages as well as from specific government incentive policies. The latter is a rich aspect of China's domestic environment as a growing number of cities and regions have adopted several different forms of economic and technology incentive policies aimed at attracting greater shares of China's growing inward FDI.
A specific goal of our study was to examine whether such policies were indeed One could reasonably expect that when such uncertainty was at its greatest, designated areas for foreign investment, such as SEZs and OCCS, would have their strongest attraction.
Foreign investors that were hesitant about China's open door policy and the stability of preferential treatments at that time, would seek SEZs and OCCs as a relatively low risk alternative in a comparatively high risk nation.
Not surprisingly, we observed such a strength in attraction. Perhaps somewhat more surprisingly, SEZs and OCCs still effectively drew Japanese investment in the 1990s, albeit at a weaker pace, especially for SEZs. Such persistence could be explained in part by a path dependence in Japanese investment over time. This path dependence occurs as secondary firms within an industry, or firms embedded in corporate groups, follow the investment patterns of first and early entrants from their industry or from their industrial group (Henisz and Delios 2001) . This persistence could also come about from more general agglomeration effects (Head et al. 1995) , although it is important to try to discern which firms, more than others, would be susceptible to agglomeration economies (Chung and Kalnins 2001) . In terms of the benefits of agglomeration in this particular context, it may have come about as much from inferred information about a particular region, as prior firms' investments provide information that help reduce search costs in factually opaque environment, as from specific economic factors. Other forms of agglomeration such as developed pools of labor and technology spillovers might not have been in existence because of plausibly lower levels of technology employed in early investments and the relatively tight labor markets in China within SEZs. The latter feature might point to a 'ceiling effect' in agglomeration in which stiff competition for resources in heavily-invested areas, might have led a firm to seek alternative investment locations. Clearly, to discern the validity of this explanation requires a more micro-approach than we have taken in this study, with explicit consideration of wage rates and skills.
Turning to factors related to the quality of the investment location, the positive estimates for several of the coefficients on the factors suggest that Japanese FDI in China was sensitive to the overall "quality" of an investment location, that is; how well a location was developed. This influence was observed beyond that of the government policy designations as policy designated areas did not necessarily capture the "quality" of a In terms of specific results for the "quality" indicators, the Infrastructure variable was positively associated with the location of both manufacturing and service sector investment.
The existence of a relatively dense highway and railway network was an important factor in the location choice of Japanese investors. Without an efficient means of transportation, the operation of the plant would be hampered, particularly if it was organised on a just-in-time system as plants in Japan typically are, and as many manufacturing subsidiaries of Japanese firms in North America tend to be.
Regional Development, but not Market Size, was positively related to investment inflows. This result was found in the full sample, as well as in the manufacturing sub-sample.
It indicates Japanese investors were responding to the quality of a region's attributes --such as the availability of a skilled and educated employment base --when situating an investment.
Meanwhile, the insignificance of Market Size reflects the lack of importance placed by Japanese investors on local markets. Taken together, these two variables suggest that subsidiaries were being developed with an eye to serving Japanese or third country markets, where the placement in China was to improve the competitiveness of the foreign investor's firm in its markets outside of China.
In our split sample analyses, we found the Trade factor to be positively associated with service sector investment but not associated with manufacturing investment. This result implies that prior trading ties were important for the location choice of service-sector firms, principally wholesale trading subsidiaries, as Japanese firms moved the location of the conduct of such activities to regions in which trading was centred, specifically highly urbanised municipalities such as Shanghai and Beijing. To the extent that production was oriented towards Japan and third country markets, it might have been exported through manufacturing plants situated in SEZs and OCCs. As well, products would move through trading subsidiaries that were sited in historically active trading areas.
Further to this point, investments in a policy designated area tended to be made under terms that dictated a certain percentage of a subsidiary's output be sold abroad. This suggests that subsidiaries established in policy areas were oriented to production towards outside markets. With the weakening in the influence of SEZs and OCCs on Japanese firm's location choices, there is some evidence that Japanese firms motivations for investing in China have been changing. As areas within China begin to approach the promise and potential that has been forecast, Japan's firms need to reorient their strategy towards more intensive development of local market penetration. This means establishing regional production networks across China to try to occupy the Chinese market and satisfy domestic demand in
China. With such a strategy, export-related policy promotions become less persuasive, and other forms of policy incentives directed towards improving factors of production begin to hold greater weight in the location decisions of Japanese firms.
At a broader level, policy makers seeking to influence the flow of FDI into a region as well as its regional distribution, must be cognizant of investors' motivations. If governmental policies are consistent with the strategic objectives of investors, they will be successful. This observation suggests that the importance of policy initiatives such as SEZs and OCCS may be greatest when the uncertainty surrounding a country or a region is high relative to other areas of the world. It also suggests the effectiveness of policy determinants is period-or environmentally-dependent, to the extent that investor's motivations are subject to change over time. Returning to the context of this study, SEZs and OCCs had a historical mission to bring FDI to China, whether that mission still retains value in the eyes of investors, is now subject to greater debate.
Although we make these statements, we acknowledge that a more micro-analytic approach in which investor motivations are modelled more explicitly, rather than inferred, would enhance the cogency of these statements. Our study would also benefit from permitting greater heterogeneity among firms to enter the analysis. These points could help develop a better understanding of why Japanese FDI has grown in non-policy designated areas. This approach would likewise develop a stronger behavioral analysis of Japanese FDI as it could consider dimensions such as a firm's experience in China, its relationship to other firms in industrial networks such as horizontal and vertical keiretsu, and the ownership structure of subsidiaries, as moderators of the identified influences on location choice.
CONCLUSION
FDI in China grew rapidly in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. While much of the extant research on this phenomenon has focused on understanding determinants of ownership strategies of foreign investors (Pan 1996; Li and Shenkar 1997) , little work has been undertaken concerning the sub-national characteristics of foreign investment activity in China 
